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It is commonly claimed that labour law is “conflict law.” The very nature of the employment 
relationship, which is essentially non-egalitarian, the deeply divergent interests of employees 
and employers, and the reality of the workplace make the conflicts that labour law was devised 
to govern inevitable.1 Since employees are the disadvantaged party, the question of access to 
justice becomes particularly acute. Indeed, employees’ rights and remedies under the law must 
be accessible and easily exercised in the competent jurisdictions, thus helping ensure the 
effectiveness of labour law.  
Given the frequency of labour conflicts and the threat they represent to the survival of 
capitalism,2 the legal system has institutionalized a method of handling labour disputes with the 
aim of compensating to some extent for the power imbalance between the parties, and in so 
doing, guaranteeing the parties rapid access to a form of justice and the pursuit of economic 
activity. The method initially used was quasi-legal and took the form of an administrative 
tribunal, less formal than a court of law, but with its own set of formal constraints and system 
costs.  
But the costs of justice to employees wishing to exercise their rights and remedies under 
Quebec labour laws have been a source of concern to the Quebec government for several 
decades, particularly the more general question of access to justice, defined as “the action of 
making accessible a form of justice that must be perceived as a form of justice by the person for 
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whom it is intended and that responds to his or her motivations and expectations of justice.”3 
This definition highlights the importance of putting relatively simple, quick and inexpensive 
conflict settlement mechanisms within the reach of employees and employers. In addition to 
this objectively verifiable economic aspect, the definition also raises a subjective aspect: It is 
important for such mechanisms to be perceived as legitimate by the parties and the objective of 
resolving disputes can be achieved by several means. 
The Quebec state has therefore sought other ways of meeting the challenge of making justice 
accessible, such as alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods, which, unlike administrative 
justice, encourage the parties to actively seek a mutually acceptable resolution with a view to 
obtaining justice that meets their needs, more quickly and inexpensively than by going to court. 
Third-party mediation and conciliation of labour conflicts are examples of ADR methods.  
The object of our analysis is to describe the scope of this phenomenon in Quebec and to offer 
critical reflection on the issues raised by this tendency to resort to ADR methods to promote 
justice in labour conflicts. The analysis will be limited to individual labour relations, the system 
under which most employees in Quebec work. In fact, close to 60% of Quebec employees are 
not part of a bargaining unit for which a union has been accredited to represent them.4  
This analysis is presented in three parts. The first sets forth the main reasons why the Quebec 
government decided to encourage ADR methods as the principal means of resolving labour 
disputes. The second part presents the results of some institutional ADR methods in labour law. 
The third and last part is a critical, prospective analysis of the use of ADR methods to facilitate 
employees’ access to justice and improve the effectiveness of labour law. 
 
I – Towards Justice Promoting Out-of-Court Settlement of Labour Conflicts in Quebec 
The development of labour law in Quebec rests on three pillars: Civil Law, collective labour 
relations and direct state involvement in determining working conditions for all employees. 
Civil Law has played a real, if somewhat minimal, role in defining labour relations, starting with 
the Industrial Revolution in the early 19th century. Industrialization saw employers committing 
flagrant abuses that Civil Law was unable to prevent. That led to the birth of the labour 
movement and the development of collective labour relations, which grew significantly from the 
1930s until the early 1970s. Since that time, the Quebec Labour Code (LC) has provided a legal 
framework for trade union representation and collective bargaining in companies. 5  The 
                                                          
3. J.-F. Roberge, La justice participative: Changer le milieu juridique par une culture intégrative de règlement des 
différends (Cowansville, QC: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2011) at 23. [Translated from French] 
4. A. Labrosse, “La présence syndicale au Québec en 2011” (2012) 9 Regards sur le travail at 1. 
5. Labour Code, RSQ, c. C-27. 
3 
 
subsequent rapid rate of technological change in the means of production and the globalization 
of economic markets have adversely affected unionization rates in North America. Working 
conditions have deteriorated and the unionization rate in Quebec (the highest in North America) 
peaked at about 40%.  
In parallel, since about the mid-1970s, Quebec state has acted on a massive scale to provide a 
framework for working conditions and relations between employers and employees,6  as 
evidenced by the Act Respecting Labour Standards (ALS),7 the Pay Equity Act (PEA),8 the Act 
Respecting Occupational Health and Safety (AOHS)9 and the Act Respecting Industrial Accidents 
and Occupational Diseases (AIAOD).10 In addition, the enactment in 1975 of the Quebec Charter 
of Human Rights and Freedoms11 brought profound change to relations between the state and 
individuals, as well as to private relations, including labour relations. These laws establish 
mandatory working conditions that provide universal protection for all employees. They are all 
laws of public order.12 
For each of these laws, agencies are set up to ensure compliance with the standards. Our 
discussion will be limited to the Commission des normes du travail (Labour standards 
commission, or CNT), the Commission des relations du travail (Labour relations commission, or 
CRT), the Commission de l’équité salariale (Pay equity commission, or CÉS) and the Commission 
des lésions professionnelles (Employment injuries commission, or CLP). In so doing, it created, in 
appearance at least, a situation making it likely that complaints filed under those laws could 
become “judicialized” as court rules of evidence and procedure were incorporated into a conflict 
resolution process.13  
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Stakeholders assessed the proposed conflict resolution methods in terms of cost as well as time 
and effectiveness. One result was the emergence of a school of thought that maintained that 
following the judicial model could lead to an overly judicialized system, or the “overly strict and 
exaggerated use of court rules of evidence and procedure.”14 With respect to this situation, it 
has been suggested that “the true debate concerns the acceptable degree of judicialization,”15 
because the optimal threshold is subjective. For example, someone dismissed without good and 
sufficient cause who is still unemployed and cannot afford to pay a lawyer to defend his or her 
rights may believe the system is overly judicialized. An employer, on the other hand, might feel 
that an employee’s remedies overly judicialize the conflict when the process interferes with his 
or her management rights and imposes costs that eat into company profits.  
Although the parties’ tolerance threshold varies according to their expressed positions, 
nonetheless, objectively speaking, an overly judicialized system can impede access to justice. Yet 
without true access to justice, employees’ rights, even those clearly recognized by laws of public 
order , cannot be protected. 16  Furthermore, as we shall see, CNT lawyers have been 
representing employees free of charge in any recourse under the ALS, undoubtedly the most 
important piece of legislation to Quebec employees since the 1990s, specifically to facilitate 
their access to justice.  
But over time, administrative justice, in the form of the agencies and tribunals responsible for 
enforcing labour laws set up as the Quebec government’s response to an overly judicialized 
traditional justice system, has gradually become overly judicialized itself. As Daniel Mockle 
explains:  
For all practical purposes, the complexity of the evidentiary and procedural 
issues and, above all, the highly technical nature of the various specialized 
litigation matters under them, make the assistance of a lawyer informed 
about these issues essential. Thus the increasing formalization of 
administrative justice is bringing it closer to the classic adversarial model 
typical of the operation of courts of law, with the prospect of those 
institutions undergoing a more or less subtle transformation into 
administrative courts.17 
In 1989, concerned above all by the costs and delays engendered by the overly judicialized 
administrative justice system, the Quebec government formed the Groupe de Travail sur 
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l’Accessibilité à la Justice [working group on accessibility of justice].18 The group came to the 
conclusion that to improve access to justice, there must be greater use of ADR methods.19 So 
cutting costs and reducing delays in administrative justice were the government’s main reasons 
for establishing institutional ADR methods.20  
In short, it was decided that the administrative justice favoured in Quebec to counter the effects 
of the overly judicialized traditional justice system had itself became overly judicialized. The 
administrative justice system had become too complex, too time consuming and too expensive 
and did not settle labour conflicts as it was supposed to.21 This position, expressed loud and 
clear by representatives of both employers and employees, prompted the state to introduce 
ADR methods into labour legislation. 
 
II – Alternative Dispute Resolution of Labour Conflicts in Quebec: A Practice Widely 
Adopted by Stakeholders Under the Aegis of the State 
The ALS, LC, PEA, AOHS and AIAOD therefore all provide for the institutional ADR methods that 
allow employers and employees to settle their disputes out of court. The ADR methods used by 
those agencies are conciliation and mediation.22  
A – Commission des normes du travail’s Mediation Service  
The CNT[labour standards commission] was set up to enforce the labour standards laid out in 
the ALS.23 It does so by receiving and handling several categories of complaints, chiefly 
pecuniary and administrative;24 prohibited practices (dismissal for being pregnant, forced 
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retirement at a certain age, etc.);25 dismissal without good and sufficient cause (for employees 
having two or more years of continuous service at the same enterprise);26 and psychological 
harassment.27 When a pecuniary complaint is filed (claim for pay or other compensation not 
paid by the employer, such as vacation, statutory holidays, severance pay, etc.), the CNT 
investigates. If the complaint is deemed to be founded, the CNT  then initiates, on the 
employee’s behalf, proceedings against the employer in general courts of law.28 The employee is 
represented without cost by CNT lawyers. In cases of complaints concerning prohibited 
practices, dismissal without good and sufficient cause and psychological harassment,29 CNT 
lawyers also represent the employee free of charge at hearings before a specialized 
administrative tribunal, the CRT. 
The CNT offers free mediation services to employees and employers when it receives a 
complaint concerning prohibited practices, psychological harassment or dismissal without good 
and sufficient cause. These two measures (free representation before tribunals and ADR) were 
taken to enable the parties to settle their conflicts more quickly and cheaply (especially for 
employees who were at a great disadvantage with respect to employers and who, most of the 
time, had to give up their suit or settle “at a bargain rate”). 
B – Commission des relations du travail’s Conciliation Service 
The CRT [labour relations commission] is an administrative tribunal established in 2002 under 
the Labour Code. Today the CRT “has, through conciliation or decisions, a full range of remedies 
related to employment, both individual and collective labour relations, protection of the public 
through maintenance of essential services, the status of artists, professional qualifications and 
the construction industry. During legal strikes, it also determines and assesses essential services 
in both the public and quasi-public sectors.”30 
The CRT offers free conciliation to the parties to a dispute on request,31 especially to ensure 
prompt handling of complaints. Employees whose complaints under the ALS have been referred 
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to the CRT are usually represented free of charge by a CNT lawyer in conciliation or at a hearing 
before the CRT. 
The CRT encourages the parties to a conflict to negotiate settlements by themselves or with the 
help of their qualified staff at any stage of the process. In short, the CRT, like the CNT, aims 
primarily for settlements to ensure that conflicts are resolved simply, speedily and 
inexpensively. When a settlement cannot be reached or when one of the parties fails to respect 
it, the case is referred to a hearing before a CRT commissioner for a final ruling. The parties may 
reach a settlement through negotiation any time prior to the commissioner’s ruling. 
C – Commission de l’Équité salariale’s Conciliation Service 
The CÉS [pay equity commission] was established in 1996 to implement the Pay Equity Act “to 
redress differences in compensation due to the systemic gender discrimination suffered by 
persons who occupy positions in predominantly female job classes.”32 
Since 2002, the CÉS has offered a conciliation service in cases of disputes or complaints. Within 
the meaning of the PEA, a dispute is a conflict that occurs when the members of a company’s 
pay equity committee, whether employee or employer representatives, cannot agree as to the 
application of the Act. One of the parties may then submit the dispute to the Commission.33 
Under the PEA, a complaint is a conflict that occurs when an employee or union feels that the 
members of the pay equity committee have failed to apply the Act. In such cases, a complaint 
may be filed with the CÉS.  
The CÉS offers conciliation in both those types of conflict. Once the parties have agreed to take 
part, the CÉS appoints a conciliator to help settle the dispute. Should a settlement not be 
reached or should either of the parties fail to respect it, the CÉS investigates and issues a ruling.  
D – Commision des lésions professionnelles’Conciliation Service 
The CLP [employment injuries commission] is an administrative tribunal established in 1998 
under the Act to Establish the Commission des Lésions Professionnelles and Amending Various 
Legislative Provisions.34 The CLP is governed by the AIAOD and charged with hearing and 
deciding contestations of decisions made by the Commission de la Santé et de la Sécurité du 
Travail du Québec [Quebec workers’ compensation commission] after an administrative 
review.35 Contestations mainly concern recognition of occupational injuries, the right to refuse 
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to perform dangerous work36 and the right of pregnant or breast-feeding women to be 
preventively reassigned.37 
Since its establishment, the CLP has offered free conciliation services to the parties to a dispute 
at any stage of a case. Conciliation is governed by legislation38  and the CLP’s internal 
procedures.39 The goal is always to settle disputes quickly and efficiently. Generally speaking, a 
conflict between an employee and employer that has not been settled in conciliation is quickly 
referred to a CLP commissioner for adjudication, although settlement is possible at any time up 
until the commissioner issues a ruling. 
E – Results of Institutional ADR Methods 
The tables below, based on information published by the four government agencies discussed 
above, show the results obtained for the ADR methods. Table 1 gives the percentage of parties 
who agree to mediation or conciliation rather than going before the administrative tribunal 
provided for by statute.  
Table 1 
Acceptance rate (%) of proposed mediation or conciliation rather than administrative tribunal 
hearings, 2003–2004 to 2013–2014 
 2003
–
2004 
2004
–
2005 
2005
–
2006 
2006
–
2007 
2007
–
2008 
2008
–
2009 
2009
–
2010 
2010
–
2011 
2011
–
2012 
2012
–
2013 
2013
–
2014 
CNT  82.1 84.9 89.6 85.7 84.9 85.5 85.4 83.9 84.9 85.8  
CÉS – 
Complaints 
83 82 100 94.7 93 88.7 94.9 100 100 98 91 
CÉS – 
Disputes 
83 82 100 94.7 93 88.7 94.9 83 100 94 100 
 
This table illustrates the steady success of mediation and conciliation over a decade. In the case 
of the CNT, acceptance rates remain stable but high, and in the case of CÉS, the rate has climbed 
to the ceiling of 100% in the case of disputes, while it has increased by 10% in the case of 
complaints.  
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39. On this subject, see Québec, Cadre d’exercice de la conciliation à la Commission des lésions professionnelles, 
http://www.clp.gouv.qc.ca/documentation/autres_documents/le_cadre_dexercice_de_la_conciliation.html, accessed 
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Table 2 gives the percentage of disputes settled by mediation or conciliation.  
Table 2 
Success rate (%) of proposed mediation or conciliation rather than administrative tribunal 
hearings, 2003–2004 to 2013–2014 
 2003–
2004 
2004
–
2005 
2005
–
2006 
2006
–
2007 
2007
–
2008 
2008
–
2009 
2009
–
2010 
2010
–
2011 
2011
–
2012 
2012
–
2013 
2013
–
2014 
CNT 64.9 70.1 67.2 64.8 67.5 64.3 63.7 67.9 69.2 71.5  
CRT 81.7 86.6 84 83.4 80.9 81.2 82.7 82.9 79.7 82.9  
CÉS – 
Complaints 
– – – – – 89.6 92.3 100 95 100 99 
CÉS – 
Disputes 
– – – – – 89.6 92.3 85 85 100 75 
CLP 49 49.5 48.6 48.8 49.8 51.6 48.3 46.9 48.9 51 51.9 
 
This table shows how well these mechanisms find solutions accepted by both parties; the 
success rate varies depending on the agency, but is still impressive in the first four cases, ranging 
from 52% to 72%.  
Despite disparities in the way the four government agencies compile statistics, the results of 
ADR methods in labour cases are still impressive. They demonstrate a legal culture strongly 
focused on out-of-court settlement of labour conflicts.  
The results of complaints filed under the ALS and handled by the CRT are especially revealing of 
this culture (Table 3). Between 2010 and 2013, 60% of complaints were settled out of court. But 
there are also many settlements hidden behind the relatively high number of dropped cases 
(28%). In all, 88% of complaints submitted were settled or dropped without a CRT ruling.  
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Table 3 
Handling of complaints submitted to CRT under ALS, 2010–2011, 2011–2012 and 2012–201340 
Total number of complaints closed by CRT (ALS)  7,386 
Complaints handled without hearing  
Settlements (reached directly by parties or after pre-
decision conciliation) 
Cases dropped 
6,533 (88%) 
4,437 (60%) 
 
2,091 (28%) 
Rulings on grounds (complaint accepted or rejected) 853 (12%) 
 
Yet the data do not indicate which factors contribute to the success or failure of these 
mechanisms. Moreover, they say nothing about employee perceptions of respect for fairness 
during the mediation and conciliation process or about access to justice. And they do not say 
whether settlements reached under the aegis of these government agencies helped achieve the 
goals of the legislation.  
III – Do Québec ADR Methods Give Employees Access to Justice and Make Labour Laws 
More Effective? 
The Quebec state seems to have achieved its objective of giving employees easy access to 
labour conflict resolution mechanisms and limiting the effects of an overly judicialized system in 
such cases. In fact, the parties use ADR methods on a grand scale, and the figures show that 
these mechanisms result in settlements in a very large number of cases. For example, parties 
that take a conflict to the CNT agree to mediation in over 80% of cases, and the success rate of 
this form of ADR has held steady for the past decade. This success rate is over 80% for 
complaints (prohibited practice, unfair dismissal or psychological harassment) referred to the 
CRT in which the parties have agreed to attend a conciliation session.  
Although those figures speak volumes, they cannot say what employees and employers actually 
perceive. Do they think that ADR methods deliver justice? And furthermore, objectively, do 
these mechanisms ensure the effectiveness of labour law? No studies have yet been done on 
precisely those questions.41 It therefore remains to be seen whether the ADR methods offered 
by the CNT, CRT, CÉS and the CLP give employees greater access to justice and ensure the 
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effectiveness of labour law. We have seen, however, that the purpose of establishing labour 
relations administrative tribunals was to solve the major social problem of the disparity of 
resources between the parties. Despite that, when employees use ADR methods outside the 
specific framework of the ALS, they do not enjoy free representation and must therefore pay a 
lawyer out of their own pockets, which does not help restore the balance between the parties. 
The literature also raises the question of the limited scope of a settlement, as compared to a 
court ruling, and that of the ability to ensure that public statute standards are met by private 
agreements.  
A – Resource Disparity Between Parties 
According to Owen Fiss,42 ADR methods pose a problem in conflict resolution, because they do 
not take into account the disparities in resources between the parties. He argues that the poorer 
party is generally less able to gather information that would be useful in negotiations. 
Furthermore, that party may not be able to afford to wait for damages to be paid, even if he or 
she is entitled to them. In short, the poorer party knows ahead of time that it will want to settle 
because it cannot afford to go to court.  
According to Gay Clarke and Iyla Davies,43 on the other hand, one must bear  in mind that some 
ADR methods are provided free of charge. Furthermore, the aim of those mechanisms is to 
settle conflicts by means of mutually satisfactory agreements. Consequently, resource disparity 
between the parties is not an issue and except in extreme situations, ADR methods allow justice 
to be served relatively simply, quickly, inexpensively and in response to the parties’ needs. 
ADR methods provided for by Quebec labour law partially solves the problems raised by these 
authors. First of all, it is free to the parties. The organization, procedure and operation of the 
process are under the aegis of the state and set out in legislation. Last, mediators and 
conciliators are paid agents of the state, fully independent of the parties. In other words, these 
ADR methods are statute-based and public, not private, in nature.  
That being said, aside from the three grounds for seeking remedies under the ALS (prohibited 
practice, dismissal without good and sufficient cause and psychological harassment), for which 
the employee is in almost all cases represented free of charge by a CNT lawyer, both during 
conciliation and at the CRT hearing, the issue of resource disparity is still relevant in ADR 
processes before the CÉS and CLP. In those cases, employees represent themselves or hire a 
lawyer at their own expense. The same question could be asked with regard to mediation 
organized by the CNT right after a complaint is filed under the ALS (except for a pecuniary 
complaint, as we have seen), as the employee is generally not represented by agency lawyers 
                                                          
42. O. Fiss, “Against Settlement” (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal at 1082–1084. [article 1073–1090, citation 1076] 
43. G. R. Clarke and I. T. Davies, “ADR: Argument for and Against Use of the Mediation Process Particularly in Family 
and Neighbourhood Disputes” (1991) 7 Queensland University of Technology Law Journal at 81–95.  
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until the case has been referred to the CRT for a hearing. (Even then, conciliation is still possible 
before the hearing takes place—and is very often used, with a success rate of 80%.)  
While these ADR methods can resolve a significant number of labour conflicts, there is still 
reason to reflect on why the parties decided to resolve them in that way. The basis of that 
choice still not known: Is it a true preference or a forced choice? What is certain is that at the 
moment, those questions cannot be answered. 
B – Limited Scope of Settlement As Opposed to Court Ruling 
Fiss also suggests ADR is a problem because it may lead people to wrongly believe that a 
settlement is an acceptable substitute for a judgment. For example, if one party is reluctant to 
comply with a settlement, the parties will find themselves back at square one. Like Lascoumes,44 
Fiss emphasizes that a settlement cannot serve as a foundation for subsequent court 
involvement. From this perspective, it could be said that essentially, the aim of a settlement is to 
allow the parties to “secure peace” privately, while the function of a judgment is much broader. 
A judgment is only the beginning in a public matter that may see continuing court involvement 
in the same case and also set a precedent for others to come.  
Unlike Fiss, Clarke and Davies argue that the aim of ADR methods is to solve conflicts by means 
of mutually acceptable agreements. More particularly, ADR methods allow the parties to find a 
made-to-measure solution to their own particular conflict, which is part of their own particular 
reality. From this point of view, it is unlikely that one party would decide not to apply the 
settlement. It is also highly unlikely that other parties might find themselves in an identical 
situation. Consequently, publishing settlements would not be useful because they would be 
taken out of context. 
In Quebec, the possibility of coercion in agreements reached through ADR methods is not really 
an issue. In fact, a validly reached settlement is a “transaction” that “has, between the parties, 
the authority of a final judgment.”45 Furthermore, it is “subject to compulsory execution” once it 
has “been homologated.”46 In other words, it has the same value and scope between the parties 
as a Québec Superior Court judgment. So an employee who reaches an agreement through an 
ADR method does not need to worry that the employer will not respect it. And the reverse is 
equally true: An employee who, for example, declines to return to work at a company as part of 
a settlement cannot change his or her mind later. 
                                                          
44. P. Lascoumes, “De nouveaux lieux pour le règlement des conflits” (1990) 75 Le Courrier du CNRS, “Les sciences 
du droit” at 71–72.  
45. Civil Code of Québec, SQ, 1991, c. 64, s. 2633.  
46. Ibid. 
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As far as the publication of out-of-court settlements is concerned, unlike a court or tribunal 
ruling, a settlement achieved by an ADR method remains strictly confidential unless court 
approval is required.47 In matters of prohibited practices, dismissal without good and sufficient 
cause and psychological harassment—to name just the three main grounds for seeking remedies 
under the ALS—confidentiality is essential to both the employer, who does not wish to publicize 
the amount paid or the terms of the agreement, and the employee, who does not wish to 
publicize the complaint nor the grounds for dismissal cited by the employer. The employee 
actually wishes to limit disclosure of personal information, so as not to harm his or her chances 
of finding another job quickly.  
In contrast, a court judgment is public and establishes case law by interpreting the law. It also 
greatly exceeds the strict framework of an individual conflict between parties and adds to the 
body of interpretation of public policy standards respecting labour. In so doing, each ruling helps 
“say what the law is,” and may in that way be useful to other actors in similar situations. A 
settlement is confidential and limited solely to the particular context of the conflict between the 
two parties, is not so widely disseminated and is not applicable to other parties that may have 
the same conflict later. Does that mean that ADR methods do not help achieve the ends of a law 
of public order?  
C – Can Conflicts Involving the Application of Labour Standards of Public Order Be Resolved 
Through Private Agreements?  
Fiss raises an interesting point: In his opinion, it is unacceptable for conflicts involving public 
standards to be settled through private negotiations leading to strictly confidential agreements. 
In this respect, he questions the purpose of the various remedies exercised under civil law if 
parties seeking justice turn to mechanisms that do not publicize the application of rules that 
they have nonetheless chosen to govern them in their society. He feels that this does not 
contribute to development of the law.  
Clarke and Davies, however, maintain that the very basis of ADR methods is to allow parties to 
take control over their own situation and, more particularly, not to involve the state in settling 
their conflicts. This helps reduce the backlog in the court system and lessen the tax burden on all 
taxpayers. The aim of ADR methods is to solve conflicts by taking into account both legal norms 
and person-oriented norms. This helps the parties feel that they have obtained justice. 
According to Clarke and Davies, the fact that negotiations are confidential facilitates the 
exchange of information between the parties, and not only fosters a better relationship 
between them or an amicable break in their relations, but also their commitment to compliance 
with the agreement.  
This complex issue deserves its own analysis, which goes well beyond the scope of this paper. 
Nonetheless, we believe that answers could be supplied by parties who have used the 
                                                          
47. Résolution, supra, note 22 at 70. 
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institutional ADR methods offered by the CNT, CRT, CÉS and CLP. Only they can confirm whether 
they really enjoyed access to justice and whether, looking back with a little distance, they 
actually obtained justice. Where applicable, it would be reasonable to claim that those 
mechanisms can foster the effectiveness of labour law.  
*  *  * 
The use of ADR methods to obtain justice and strengthen the effectiveness of labour law 
definitely raises some very important questions, but as all we have to go on at present is general 
ideological considerations, it is impossible to answer them. Hence the need to conduct in-depth 
empirical research, questioning front-line actors (employees, employers, their respective legal 
counsel, mediators and conciliators).  
A few years ago, Jean-Yves Brière wrote this about the results obtained through  conciliation 
offered by the CRT, an opinion which could easily apply to other institutional ADR methods: 
Regardless of these impressive figures, qualitative analysis of settlements 
needs to be done. Indeed, not only must a settlement be reached, but it 
must respect the parameters of legal precedent and be satisfactory to both 
parties. We currently have no data on the subject and so must be cautious 
in analysing the statistics.48 
Institutional ADR methods are means of social regulation that help find pragmatic solutions to 
conflicts. They can solve conflicts more simply, quickly and cheaply than judicial and 
administrative tribunals do. Aside from the fact of settling such conflicts relatively simply, 
quickly and inexpensively, it must be determined whether employees feel that the institutional 
ADR methods offered by the CNT, CRT, CÉS and CLP truly improve their access to justice, both 
objectively, in terms of respecting the aims of the law, and subjectively, in terms of their 
representations of justice. We also believe that it would be just as legitimate to study the effects 
of such a trend towards instituting ADR methods from both a societal and individual point of 
view, for the satisfaction of those seeking justice is only one of the goals of justice. Fairness and 
consistency in the application of the law is another.  
 
                                                          
48. J.-Y. Brière, “La Commission des relations du travail: Cinq ans déjà! (première partie)” (2009) 9:9 Bulletin CCH 
Travail. [Translated from French] 
